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1. Introduction 
Following  the  9/11  attacks  on  the  World  Trade  Center  the  latest,  transnational  terrorism 
became subject of intense research. Still, what determines the terrorists’ choice of target is not 
yet fully understood. Previous research suggests that economic development, but also political 
institutions such as, e.g., countries’ degree of democracy, electoral system or constraints to 
the central government are important, while – surprisingly – the effect of national wealth is 
rather ambiguous (Abadie 2006, Frey and Luechinger 2004, Li 2005, Li and Schaub 2004).
1  
In this paper, we propose an additional institutional determinant of transnational terror: 
a target country’s degree of decentralized governance structure. According to the analysis in 
Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer (2007), decentralization increases individual well-being, while 
Frey,  Luechinger  and  Stutzer  (2007)  show  terrorism  to  substantially  reduce  well-being. 
Arguably, one channel by which decentralization can increase societal welfare might thus be 
its impact on terrorism. Indeed, Frey and Luechinger (2004) argue that decentralized countries 
are  politically  and  administratively  more  stable  than  more  centralized  states  and, 
consequently, are less affected by terrorist attacks – as terrorists perceive the ‘benefits’ of 
their activities to decrease with the degree of decentralization. In addition, Li (2005) argues 
that increased political efficiency leads to less dissatisfaction and more political involvement 
of the population so that terror groups will be less successful in recruiting (dissatisfied) local 
residents as new members. As a consequence, less terrorist activities should occur in more 
decentralized countries.   
However,  the  beneficial  impact  of  decentralization  on  terror  prevention  is  not  as 
obvious as it might look at first sight. The traditional public finance literature suggests that 
decentralization may harm the production of public goods such as public safety. For example, 
decentralization  may  create  coordination  problems,  lead  to  an  underprovision  and 
underfinancing of public safety, less policy innovation (Rose-Ackerman 1980, Strumpf 2002), 
and cause understaffing of security forces and other inefficiencies in fighting terrorism. In 
consequence, decentralization may make countries more vulnerable to terrorist attacks, as the 
marginal costs of committing terror are reduced, and we should expect terrorism to be more 
frequent in such decentralized countries.  
The  theoretical  arguments  underlying  our  analysis  are  derived  from  Frey  and 
Luechinger (2004) and Li (2005). Surprisingly, the hypothesized effects of decentralization on 
terror have not yet been empirically tested. This omission is most likely due to the lack of 
                                                
1 Regarding the determinants of terror in the terrorist’s countries of origin see Freytag, Krüger and Schneider 
(2006).   3 
adequate  data  on  terrorism  and  political  decentralization  until  most  recently.  Clearly, 
answering the question whether decentralization deters or attracts terrorists bears important 
policy implications. Answering this question is exactly the aim of this paper. 
Specifically, this paper fills the gap in the literature by testing empirically whether and 
to what extent decentralization reduces or promotes transnational terror, based on a panel of 
109  countries  over  the  period  1976-2000.  To  anticipate  our  results,  we  find  that  fiscal 
decentralization  reduces  the  occurrence  of  transnational  terrorist  events,  while  political 
autonomy does not affect terror.  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section derives our hypotheses. Section 3 
describes our measures of terrorism and decentralization, while the method of estimation is 
outlined in section 4. The fifth section presents the results and the final section concludes. 
 
2. Hypotheses 
We base our hypotheses on the effect of decentralization on transnational terror on two main 
and rather independent arguments. The first relates to the willingness of local residents to 
support  transnational  terrorist  groups  and  execute  their  plans.  Such  willingness  arguably 
depends on the degree to which local policy outcomes are in line with citizens’ preferences. 
Our second argument relates to the stability of the target country’s polity, and how it may be 
affected by terror.  
Turning  to  the  first  argument,  according  to  Frey  and  Stutzer  (2000),  Li  (2005), 
Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer (2007), and Dorn et al. (2007) the lack of opportunities to 
effectively  participate  in  political  decision-making  induces  political  grievances  and 
dissatisfaction with the process and the policy outcomes in the resident population. Building 
on this idea, Li (2005) argues that as democratic political systems increase political efficacy, 
transnational  terror  groups  will  be  less  successful  in  recruiting  discontent  or  politically 
marginalized local residents as supporters. In a similar vein, decentralization of the politico-
administrative system arguably makes governments more honest and efficient, as it brings 
officials  closer  to  the  people.  The  economic  theory  of  bureaucracy  and  the  literature  on 
institutional  competition  demonstrate  that  competition  among  public  agencies  reduces 
bureaucratic  waste  (e.g.,  Niskanen  1971),  improves  respect  for  regional  differences  in 
preferences  (Tiebout  1961),  serves  as  a  discovery  procedure  (Hayek  1968),  strengthens 
democratic control ("voice") and protects local minorities by facilitating "exit" (Hirschman 
1970). Decentralization forces politicians to compete, leading to the improvement of local 
democracy and political accountability (Betz 1996). Decentralization thus permits dissenting   4 
residents to escape local policies they do not agree to by moving to a different jurisdiction in a 
Tiebout fashion, reducing the likelihood of becoming member of a terror group induced by 
their discontent. Clearly, with heterogeneous preferences in the population, not only political, 
but equally spending decentralization is likely to reduce terror. 
Frey and Luechinger (2004) provide additional arguments. According to their analysis, 
one of the immediate main goals pursued by terrorists is to destabilize the polity of their target 
country.
2  As  Frey  and  Luechinger  argue,  “when  the  government  loses  power,  and  more 
importantly,  when  the  political  system’s  legitimacy  is  eroded,  the  terrorists’  chances  of 
achieving their goal improve” (ibidem, p.511). Thus, a governance structure that stabilizes the 
polity in a functional-systemic sense should decrease the marginal benefits of terrorist acts in 
a  terrorists’  cost-benefit  analysis,  reducing  the  levels  of  terrorist  activities.  Linking  their 
argument to decentralization, the authors argue that “a polity with many different centers of 
decision-making and implementation is difficult, if not impossible, to destabilize” (ibidem, 
p.512).  
For illustration, think of a biological entity that is composed of a multitude of cells 
expanding in all three dimensions. In such multi-cell entity, the destruction of one cell does 
not endanger the entity as a whole, as the remaining cells can take over the functions of the 
dysfunctional one. This may be observable not only at the horizontal level (namely across 
cells  at  the  same  level),  but  also  and  more  often  in  the  vertical  (across  layers  of  cells). 
Applying  this  idea  to  states  and  their  institutional  settings,  Frey  and  Luechinger  (2004) 
analogously  argue  that  lower-tier  governments  and  administrations  can  take  over 
responsibilities  of dysfunctional either higher-tier or other lower-tier decision-making and 
executing  institutions.  In  contrast,  in  unitary  countries  non-functioning  and  destroyed 
(political  and  administrative)  centers  are  likely  to  lead  to  country-wide  collapse.  Thus, 
decentralization may stabilize the polity and, at the same time, reduce the damage of terror on 
the governance structure, as decentralized countries recover more quickly. Consequently, Frey 
and Luechinger (2004) expect ‘spatial decentralization’ – related to some kind of vertical 
division of ‘decision-making’ power but also ‘implementation’ power between various tiers of 
government  – to deter terror. These considerations lead to our first hypothesis. 
                                                
2 Gassebner et al. (2007a, b) provide empirical evidence. According to their results, terrorists are at least to some 
extent  successful  in  destabilizing  the  political  system,  as  terror  attacks  increase  the  probability  of  cabinet 
dissolutions. Two additional intermediate goals of terrorists, as discussed in Frey and Luechinger (2004), are to 
attract publicity and media attention, and to damage the economy to incur material costs on the population. As 
these aims are not directly related to decentralization, we do not discuss them here. See Schnellenbach (2006) for 
a recent discussion of terrorists’ motives.   5 
 
Hypothesis 1: Decentralization reduces the number of terrorist incidents. 
 
The impact of decentralization on the occurrence of transnational terror is, however, not as 
obvious as it might look at first sight. Applying more traditional arguments that relate to the 
quality of public safety, decentralization might create coordination problems which may delay 
or  prevent  reforms,  thus  making  terror  prevention  less  effective.
3  Moreover,  institutional 
constraints imposed by divided powers in decentralized countries might significantly weaken 
the federal and local governments’ ability to fight both domestic and transnational terror. 
More  specifically,  horizontal  information  externalities  might  imply  the  underprovision  of 
policy  innovation,  preventing  sensible  institutional  reforms  that  may  aggravate  these 
coordination problems and inefficiencies (Rose-Ackerman 1980, Strumpf 2002).
4 Moreover, 
competition between jurisdictions might cause a “race to the bottom,” driving local tax rates 
below the level necessary to sufficiently finance public goods such as public safety, leading to 
their underprovision.
5 In general, small jurisdictions might prevent internalization of positive 
externalities  created  by locally  produced  public  goods  and,  thus,  lead  to  understaffing  of 
security forces. Consequently, decentralization might allow foreign terrorists to organize and 
manoeuvre more easily, thereby reducing the costs of transnational terrorist activity.
6  
In addition, as Li (2005) argues, policy inaction and political deadlock arising from 
constraints on central government power (such as decentralized decision-making structures) 
might heighten public frustration, thereby making it easier for transnational terrorist groups to 
recruit locally. Indeed, local residents might prefer the participation in already existing and 
well-established transnational terror networks over building up an own local terror group from 
scratch,  due  to  lower  costs  and  lower  uncertainty  with  respect  to  the  ‘success’.
7  Finally, 
according to Li (2005), the abundance of potential targets for terrorist acts makes it easier for 
                                                
3 Prud’homme (1995) and Sewell (1996) provide support for this view. 
4 However, Kotsogiannis and Schwager (2005) show that policy innovation might even occur more frequently in 
decentralized systems once politicians’ electoral motives are taken into account. 
5 Empirical evidence is, however, not in favour of this hypothesis. For example, Dreher (2006) does not find a 
significant impact of an index of globalization on tax competition in the OECD. See also Dreher, Gaston and 
Martens (2008). 
6 As one example, one might think of the coordination failure between the various state and federal institutions in 
the U.S. that prevented an early detection of the World Trade Tower attacks. 
7 For example, it might be easier to attract media attention and thus to destabilize the polity through fear, as 
reputation has already been built up.   6 
terrorists to threaten a country’s population. To the extent that the number and availability of 
‘symbolic’ targets increases with a country’s political and fiscal decentralization, on the one 
hand, a country may become a more attractive target for foreign terrorists, and, on the other, 
participation of local residents in transnational groups may become a more attractive means of 
expressing ‘voice’.
8 In consequence, decentralization may make countries more vulnerable to 
foreign  terrorists’  activities  and  their  local  support,  as  the  marginal  costs  of  committing 
attacks are reduced, and we should expect transnational terror to be more frequent in such 
decentralized countries.  
  We thus hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Decentralization increases the number of terrorist incidents. 
 
3. Measuring Decentralization and Terror 
Frey  and  Luechinger  (2004)  discuss  the  effects  of  two  forms  of  decentralization  – 
decentralization  of  ‘policy  implementation’  and  of  ‘political  decision-making’  (ibidem, 
p.512). Thus, their notion of decentralization captures the two dimensions of ‘federalism’ as 
defined  by,  e.g.,  Keman  (2000)  or  Brennan  and  Buchanan  (1980).  According  to  Keman 
(2000), federalist structures comprise decentralization with respect to “the right to act,” on the 
one hand, and “the right to decide,” on the other.
9 In general, political scientists seem to agree 
that  federal  structures  include  “a  set  of  jurisdictional  arrangements  for  allocating  policy 
responsibilities between different levels of government; this refers to both policy-making and 
policy implementation.” (Italics by us) (Obinger et al., 2005, p.9).    
However, Frey and Luechinger (2004) argue that both decision-making and policy 
implementation  constitute  two  separate  dimensions  of  a  well-functioning  decentralized 
system. Thus, our analysis accounts for these two types of decentralization. Specifically, we 
distinguish between decentralization in government spending and local political autonomy. 
The first most closely reflects the implementation of government policies through executing 
administrations  and  public  goods  creation  (“the  right  to  act,”  Keman  2000),  while  ‘local 
political autonomy’ refers to the presence of political decision- and law-making power at the 
local level (“the right to decide” Keman 2000). In political science, this latter concept is also 
referred to as decision decentralization or local autonomy (e.g., Treisman 2000).  
                                                
8 However, the value of each particular target might decrease with the number of available targets. 
9 Similarly, Brennan and Buchanan (1980) define ’federalism’ to comprise two dimensions: (i) joint assignment 
of functions and (ii) taxing power of lower levels of government.    7 
Fiscal  decentralization  is  measured  employing  data  from  the  IMF’s  Government 
Finance  Statistics  (GFS),  as  presented  in  a  dataset  compiled  by  the  World  Bank.
10  The 
numerator of these measures is total expenditure of sub-federal government tiers, while the 
denominator is total spending by all levels of government.
11 Data are employed for the period 
1976-2000 for a maximum of 109 countries.
12 Among the countries in our sample, spending 
decentralization  is  in  the  range  of  1.65-55.62  percent.  On  average,  21.48  percent  of 
government spending takes place at the sub-federal level (median: 20.27 percent). 
Furthermore, we employ a dichotomous indicator of political autonomy of second tier 
governments that takes on the value of ‘one’ if “subnational legislatures have autonomy in 
certain specified areas – i.e., constitutional authority to legislate – not explicitly subject to 
central  laws,”  collected  by  and  obtained from  Treisman  (2002).  In  other  words,  political 
autonomy is assumed to exist when the federal constitution stipulates that laws of the second 
tier cannot be overruled by federal legislation or that no right to framework legislation by the 
federal government exists (Riker 1964). Prominent examples of such autonomous sub-federal 
entities are the U.S. states, which also differ in their legal systems, and the Swiss ‘cantons’, in 
contrast to the German ‘Laender’, where only policing and schooling are truly independent 
state responsibilities. Among our sample of countries, about 16 percent are coded as federal 
with politically autonomous sub-federal tiers.  
However, note that despite the fact that our measure of fiscal decentralization seems to 
be those used most widely in empirical cross-national studies on the effects of centralization 
(e.g. Lijphart 1977, Fisman and Gatti 2002),
13 it is not free of problems. Kessing, Konrad and 
Kotsogiannis (2006) provide a summary: First, the sources of the revenues, intergovernmental 
transfers, and other grants are not taken into account. Second, they do not account for the 
                                                
10 See http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/fiscalindicators.htm (July 6, 2007). 
11  An  alternative  measure  of  fiscal  decentralization  employed  in  the  literature  on  federalism  relates  to 
decentralization of revenue. Revenue decentralization is highly correlated with expenditure decentralization (ρ = 
0.94). Our main results reported later are robust to the choice of measure. Moreover, inclusion of both measures 
of  fiscal  decentralization  shows  the  dominance  of  spending  decentralization  over  revenue  decentralization. 
Finally,  fiscal  decentralization  is  often  measured  as  tax  revenue  dependence  on  the  central  government  (ρ 
(spending  decentralization, own tax dependence) = 0.19). Replacing spending  decentralization  with this tax 
autonomy measure yields insignificant coefficients in all models of Tables 1 and 2.  
12 Selection of countries and years is driven by data availability. 
13 While this is true for cross-country studies, other political institutions such as direct democracy may be more 
important for the provisions of public goods on the state level within a country. For example, Fischer (2005) 
investigates whether direct democracy restricts the Leviathan like behavior of bureaucracies using an index of 
direct democracy.    8 
extent to which the jurisdictions’ tax bases overlap.
14 Third and most importantly, these data 
reflect only the distribution of spending responsibilities but do not contain information about 
the distribution of political power among the central and sub-national governments. It is for 
this reason we measure political autonomy separately.  
Turning to our measure of terrorist activity, we employ data provided in the MIPT 
Terrorism  Knowledge  Base.
15  The  Terrorism  Knowledge  Base  integrates  data  from  the 
RAND Terrorism Chronology and RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident databases, the Terrorism 
Indictment database, and DFI International's research on terrorist organizations.
16  
The Terrorism Knowledge Base defines terror as “violence, or the threat of violence, 
calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm. These acts are designed to coerce others 
into actions they would not otherwise undertake, or refrain from actions they desired to take. 
[…] This violence or threat of violence is generally directed against civilian targets. The 
motives of all terrorists are political, and terrorist actions are generally carried out in a way 
that will achieve maximum publicity. Unlike other criminal acts, terrorists often claim credit 
for their acts. Finally, terrorist acts are intended to produce effects beyond the immediate 
physical damage of the cause, having long-term psychological repercussions on a particular 
target audience. The fear created by terrorists may be intended to cause people to exaggerate 
the  strengths  of  the  terrorist  and  the  importance  of  the  cause,  to  provoke  governmental 
overreaction, to discourage dissent, or simply to intimidate and thereby enforce compliance 
with their demands.”
17 As terrorist acts are defined by their nature (violent and criminal acts), 
they are included in the database irrespective of the identity of the committing group or their 
long-term goals. In principle, terrorist acts might well be carried out by the violent branch of 
the political opposition to the ruling government (e.g. the RAF in Germany).  
In this paper, we focus on incidences of transnational terrorism.
18 According to MIPT, 
transnational terror events are defined according to (1) the provenience of the terrorist or their 
group or (2) the nature of the terrorists’ targets. Thus transnational terrorisms involves either 
terrorists  acting  in  a  foreign  country,  domestic  targets  that  are  associated  with  a  foreign 
                                                
14 See Treisman (2002) and Ebel and Yilmaz (2002) for a more detailed discussion. 
15 Available at: http://www.tkb.org/. 
16 There are various sources for terrorism data. We choose MIPT because it combines various sources and thus 
provides extensive country and yearly coverage. For a detailed discussion on the measurement of terrorism see 
Frey and Luechinger (2003b). 
17 See the glossary that accompanies the MIPT database. See also Enders and Sandler (1999, 2002).  
18 While our hypotheses directly refer to transnational terrorism, there is an additional reason for excluding 
domestic terror: reliable panel data on domestic terrorism is only available for a short (and recent) period of time.   9 
country (such as embassies), or targets of an international character (such as airplanes or UN-
related  entities).  According  to  this  definition,  attacks  of  local  residents  against  their  own 
governments are only counted as transnational terror events if they occur in the name of an 
internationally working network of terrorists, such as, e.g., Al Qaeda. In contrast, attacks of 
foreigners would always be counted as ‘transnational’ incidences.
19 
We  extract the  number of  transnational terror  events  for  each country  and  year.
20 
Given that the database covers the whole world, we assign zeros to all countries and years 
without  data.  According  to  our  sample  of  109  countries  from  1976-2000,  the  number  of 
terrorist events per country during the total sample period varies from 0 to 50 with an average 
of about 1.70 (or 4.57 for those country-year observations with positive values). Altogether, 
there were 710 country-years with actual incidences of transnational terror in our panel (and 
1911  country-year  observations  altogether).  Appendix  C  presents  the  average  number  of 
transnational terrorist events in the world by year. 
 




























                                                
19 The definition of MIPT for transnational events is close to that of Sandlers and Enders (2004), who base it on 
either the terrorist group’s international ramifications or its foreign interest as target.  
20 Territories are assigned to the country formally governing the territory. Kashmir and the Persian Gulf are 
excluded as it is not obvious to which country they should be assigned to.   10 
Figure 1 shows how the average number of terror events per country has evolved over 
time.
21 As shown in Appendix C, the average number of transnational terror events fluctuates 





We estimate pooled time-series cross-section regressions for panel, non-negative count data. 
The data extend to a maximum of 109 countries and cover the years 1976-2000. Since some 
of the data are not available for all countries or years, the panel data are unbalanced and the 
number of observations depends on the choice of explanatory variables. As our data on terror 
events are strongly skewed to the right (with an accumulation of observations at zero) and 
display  significant  overdispersion  (with  the  variance  being  greater  than  the  mean),  we 
estimate our regressions employing the Negative Binomial estimator.
22 
Our basic equation takes the following form: 
it t t i jit it X decent terror ε λ β β α + + + + = − − 1 ,
'
2 1 1 ,  (1) 
where terrorit represents the number of recorded transnational terror events in country 
i in period t, and decentjit-1 is our j
th (lagged) measure of decentralization. Xi,t-1 is the vector of 
(lagged) control variables, λt are fixed time effects, while  it ε  represents the disturbance. The 
low correlation between political and fiscal decentralization allows their joint inclusion.
23 As 
local autonomy shows no time series variation, the model is estimated with random effects. 
Note that the Hausman test favours this model over pooled Negative Binomial regressions. 
When testing for robustness employing fixed effects (and omitting local autonomy) the main 
results are unchanged. 
Note that our analysis focuses on the targets of terrorism rather than its sources. In 
choosing our control variables, we thus follow Dreher and Gassebner (2007) who also analyze 
the targets of terror. We employ GDP per capita (measured in constant 2000 US$). On the one 
hand, richer countries are more attractive targets for terrorists, as terror creates more attention. 
                                                
21 For time-series studies on the occurrence and distribution of terrorism see Enders and Sandler (2005, 2006). 
22 Applying OLS would bias the estimates due to the truncation at zero and the overproportional occurrence of 
zero incidences in the distribution. However, the OLS estimates are qualitatively identical to those count model 
results reported below. 
23 Correlation between political and fiscal decentralization is 0.4.   11 
On  the  other  hand,  richer  countries  can  afford  stronger  police  and  intelligence  agencies, 
potentially being able to prevent terror. The impact of per capita GDP is thus not obvious a 
priori. 
A second variable suggested to be important for terror is civil liberty, that comprises 
mainly political participation possibilities, but also aspects of economic and social freedom as 
well as a well-functioning impartial juridical system (see Freedom House 2005). The relation 
between political freedom and terrorism is also ambiguous a priori. Repressive states could 
foster terrorism (as minorities might conceive participation in transnational terror networks as 
the only “effective communication device” against state repression) or be detrimental to it (as 
repressive  states  might  be  better  able  to  suppress  terrorism  in  general).  According  to  Li 
(2005), democracy reduces the number of terrorist events, while Li and Schaub (2004) – not 
accounting for government constraints – show the opposite. As Frey and Luechinger (2003a, 
2004) argue, stronger democracy might serve as political stabilizer, decreasing the marginal 
benefit of terrorist acts, with democratic discussion culture serving as an alternative option to 
participation in transnational terrorist activities as means of expressing discontent, thus raising 
the  terrorists’  opportunity  costs.
24  In  line  with  Piazza  (2006)  and  Dreher  and  Gassebner 
(2007), we include both the level of and changes in political freedom. 
Third, we include population size, as transnational attacks in larger countries might 
attract greater international media attention. In addition, larger populations tend to be more 
heterogeneous in their preferences which may give rise to societal conflicts. Furthermore, the 
costs of state surveillance and policing might rise with population size (Piazza 2006).  
Fourth,  we  include  government  fractionalization.  According  to  Piazza  (2006),  the 
number of parties in power to some extent proxies for “social cleavage,” potentially giving 
rise to terror. Conflicting political interests might in particular extend to the foreign-based 
population. On the other hand, coalition governments may represent a larger portion of the 
population and  a larger  number  of  social  groups  compared  to a  single  party  government 
(Lijphart 1977), which may decrease the likelihood that people choose terrorism to express 
their ‘political’ preferences.   
Finally,  we  include  data  on  voting  coincidence  with  the  U.S.  in  the  UN  General 
Assembly  as  provided  by  Voeten  (2004).  As  shown  in  Dreher  and  Gassebner  (2007), 
                                                
24 Sandler (1995) provides an excellent discussion of the early literature on the relationship between democracy 
and  terror.  A  present-time  example  of  the  relation  between  missing  political  freedom  and  ‘imported’ 
transnational terrorism (partly executed by local residents) is Iraq.   12 
countries voting more frequently in line with the U.S. in the Assembly are more likely to 
become victims of terror. We follow Thacker (1999), coding votes in agreement with the U.S. 
as 1, votes in disagreement as 0, and abstentions or absences as 0.5. The resulting numbers are 
then divided by the total number of votes in each year. This results in a variable ranging from 
zero  to one, with zero indicating total disagreement with the  U.S., and  one showing full 
agreement. 
Data  for  per  capita  GDP  and  population  are  taken  from  the  World  Bank  (2006). 
Government fractionalization is from Beck et al. (2001) and measures the probability that two 
randomly drawn members from among the government are of different parties. Level and 
change in political freedom are based on the average of political rights and civil liberties from 





Table 1 shows the results. We first include fiscal decentralization and political autonomy 
separately  (columns  1  and  2),  while  column  3 includes  them jointly. All  models include 
dummies for each year, which are always jointly significant at the one percent level. Overall, 
our  results  mirror  those  reported  in  Piazza  (2006)  and  Dreher  and  Gassebner  (2007).  In 
tendency, the number of terror events increases with greater social and ethnic cleavages as 
measured by government fractionalization and population size.
25 Possibly, attacks in more 
populous countries might trigger a larger international media response. In two of the three 
specifications, terror also rises with the level of civil liberties and greater voting coincidence 
with the U.S. in the UN General Assembly, at least at the ten percent level of significance. 
Possibly, the latter also captures the proximity of a country’s foreign policy to that of the 
U.S., making the country a ‘substitute target’, with possibly lower ‘entry’ costs. GDP per 
capita is not consistently significant at conventional levels, which is consistent with Krueger 
and Malečková (2003) and Abadie (2006). Changes in political freedom have no significant 
impact on terror according to all specifications. 
Turning to our variables of primary interest, the results show a significant effect of 
expenditure decentralization on terror. At the ten percent level of significance at least, our 
                                                
25  The  coefficients  are  significant  at  the  five  percent  level  at  least  –  with  the  exception  of  government 
fractionalization which is marginally insignificant according to column 3.   13 
results show that fiscal decentralization reduces the number of terror events. The result is in 
line with our a priori hypothesis regarding the division of spending responsibilities across 
government tiers. Calculating the marginal effect of fiscal decentralization associated with the 
full model of column 3, the results show that the number of terror events a country is exposed 
to declines by 0.03 with an increase in decentralization by one percentage point. Thus, for 
example,  evaluated  at  the  mean,  the  model  predicts  that  raising  the  share  of  sub-federal 
spending from 20% to 50% will reduce the number of incidences by almost half from 1.49 to 
0.76. Clearly, this impact is quantitatively relevant and bears important welfare implications.
26  
The results of columns 2 and 3 also show that local political autonomy does not affect 
the  number  of  terror  events,  neither  separately  nor  when  jointly  included  with  fiscal 
decentralization. This finding contradicts the hypothesis that more political autonomy deters 
terrorism  through  its  structure-stabilizing  effect  on  the  political  system.  Potentially,  the 
insignificance of political autonomy might be caused by two opposing effects: on the one 
hand, local decision-making power might well decrease terrorists’ marginal benefits through 
political  stabilization  (Frey  and  Luechinger  2004),  but  on  the  other  hand,  a  politically 
decentralized  government  may  also  provide  more  potential  symbolic-bearing  targets  for 
terrorist attacks, as Li (2005) argues. Unfortunately, both effects cannot be disentangled.  
Column 4 tests for the robustness of our results to changes in the definition of the 
dependent  variable.  We  replace  the  dependent count  variable  by  a  dichotomous  indicator 
reflecting the occurrence of any transnational terror event that takes the value ‘1’ if at least 
one transnational terrorist act was recorded and ‘0’ otherwise. As can be seen, the previous 
results are confirmed. While fiscal decentralization reduces the likelihood that terror events 
occur, autonomy has no significant effect. More specifically, evaluated at the mean, raising 
the  degree  of  fiscal  decentralization  from  20%  of  total  spending  to  50%  decreases  the 
probability that a transnational terror event occurs from 39% down to 18%. 
Finally, we instrument spending decentralization to take into account that countries 
experiencing  terrorist  acts  (or  some  pre-modern  form  of  it  as,  e.g.,  peasant  riots,  ‘Robin 
Hoods’,  etc.)  might deliberately choose a centralized form  of political  and administrative 
governance.
27 As instruments we use a country’s land area, the population share of persons 
                                                
26 See Frey, Luechinger and Stutzer (2004) for an attempt to measure the welfare costs of terrorism. 
27 The effect of spending decentralization might also be driven by correlated variables we do not control for in 
the regressions. For example, the effect might be driven by higher spending on military in more centralized 
countries, either attracting terrorist activities or being a reaction to it. However, the simple correlation between 
the log of military spending as share of GDP with fiscal decentralization is less than -0.06, and the partial   14 
older  than  60  (obtained  from  the  World  Bank’s  World  Development  Indicators)  and  a 
measure of ethnic fractionalization. We conjecture that all three variables clearly account for 
historical roots of and socio-demographic causes for developing decentralized governance 
structures:  Clearly,  in  pre-modern  times  with  inefficient  means  of  communication,  larger 
countries were more likely to be in need for developing a multi-tier administrative system to 
achieve effective governance, while ethnic fractionalization accounts for the heterogeneity of 
preferences in the population. On the one hand, modern economic theory claims that the latter 
can be more efficiently targeted in decentralized systems, while historically, a heterogeneous 
population  was  traditionally  perceived  by  the  ruler  as  threat  to  unity  and  citizen  loyalty, 
leading to centralized government structures and policies.
28 Finally, a (relatively) overaging 
population today may be the result of economic success in the past, e.g. driven by an early 
industrialization about 100 years ago. In principle, we may argue that more wealth in the past 
and a broader tax base made the development of several layers of governance financially 
affordable, leading to path dependence effects explaining today’s degree of decentralization.   
We provide three specifications. First, we estimate the instrumental variable model 
using 2SLS. Second, we employ Tobit; and third, we estimate it using Probit (with clustering 
at  the  country  level),  where  the  dependent  variable  is  again  the  binary  indicator  for  the 
occurrence of any transnational terror event. The Tobit model takes into account that the 
dependent variable has only positive values, but neglects its count characteristics, while 2SLS 
assumes continuity into the positive and negative space. The endogeneity of decentralization 
is tested based on all three model specifications.  
Turning  to  the  validity  of  our  instruments,  the  instruments  meet  the  exclusion 
restriction insofar as they are neither individually nor jointly significant in the first stage 
regression (conditional on all exogenous variables). In an auxiliary OLS first stage regression 
all three instruments explain the instrumented variable jointly well, with an F-statistic meeting 
the rule-of-thumb threshold of ten (F(3, 59) = 10.72; Staiger and Stock 1987), a Shea partial 
R2 of 0.25 and an overall first stage R
2 of 0.47.
 Individually, each of the instruments is 
significant at least at the 5 percent level. As predicted, the size of the land area and an aging 
                                                                                                                                                   
correlation controlling for democratic rights and GDP is even lower in absolute values. Missing data on military 
spending for many countries and years prevents us from including this variable in the regression analysis. 
28 As well-known example consider France’s centralization process from the 15
th century onwards that led to the 
continuous  loss  of  autonomy  of  formerly  quite  independent  dukedoms  and  regions  such  as  languedoc 
(Montpellier), the Bretagne, and the Alpine dukedom of Savoyen. It was due to this policy that the city-republic 
of Geneva joined the federal country Switzerland in 1815. In general, religion cleansing policies that occurred 
over the last centuries in many countries can also be seen in this light.    15 
population are positively correlated with fiscal decentralization, while the coefficient of ethnic 
fractionalization indicates that it leads to more centralized governance structures.  
Assuming cardinality in the outcome variable, the 2SLS estimates with clustering at 
the country level (shown in column 5) reveal that the instruments are valid. They successfully 
pass the Hansen J test (χ2(1)=0.08, p-value=0.96), the Anderson-Rubin Wald test of weak 
instruments (F(2, 59)=2.03, p-value=0.12), both indicating that the overidentifying restrictions 
are  valid,  and  the  Kleibergen-Paap  test,
29  which  rejects  the  null  hypothesis  of 
underidentification  (for  the  LM  version:  (χ2  (2)=14.71,  p-value=0.00).  According  to  the 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values, the bias in the IV estimator due to weak instruments 
is between 5% and 10%. 
Testing for the exogeneity of spending decentralization using either IV Tobit, 2SLS or 
IV Probit does not reject the null hypothesis suggesting that the endogenous regressor can be 
treated  as  exogenous.
30  Not  unsurprisingly,  instrumented  spending  decentralization  still 
reduces the number of terror events, at the five percent level of significance. Moreover, given 
the non-rejection of exogeneity we should expect the estimates for decentralization to be of 
comparable  magnitude  across  instrumented  and  non-instrumented  specifications.  In  fact, 
comparing the marginal effects (evaluated at the mean) for instrumental variable Probit (IV 
Probit), pooled Probit clustered at the country level, and random effects Probit yields almost 
identical estimates (-0.0087 vs. -0.0083 and -0.0079, respectively).   
  As next step, we separate those transnational terror events that can be considered to be 
marginal from those which are severe. For the latter, we count all terrorist events in which at 
least one person was physically harmed – namely all events in which the number of persons 
killed or the number of persons injured was greater than zero. Of course, it is debatable which 
threshold constitutes a severe event. Following  Dreher,  Gassebner  and  Siemers  (2007),  we 
choose the lowest threshold possible. While this is the most objective choice from our point of 
view, we are clearly aware that events in which no one is physically harmed may still have a 
major psychological or economic impact on the population as, e.g., the London bombings of 
July 21, 2005. 
In Table 2, we report results employing the negative binomial estimator (columns 1 
and 2), panel Logit (columns 3 and 4), and IV Probit (columns 5 and 6). According to all 
regressions,  the  overall  results  observed  previously  seem  to  be  driven  by  severe  events. 
                                                
29 Rejection occurs both as LM test and as Wald test. For the latter, we observe (χ2 (2)=31.45, p-value=0.00).  
30 In 2SLS, the corresponding test statistics are χ2(1) = 1.37 with prob > χ2= 0.24, in the IV Tobit, the Wald test 
statistics are χ2(1)=1.02 with prob > chi2=0.31, and in the IV Probit, the test statistics are chi2(1)=0.57 with 
prob > chi2 = 0.45.    16 
Significant at the ten percent level at least, fiscal decentralization reduces the number and, 
respectively, the probability of severe terror events but does not affect less severe events at 
conventional levels of significance. According to the marginal effects in the count model, an 
increase in fiscal decentralization reduces the number of severe terror  events by 0.15, an 
effect quantitatively about 5 times larger than the one observed for both severe and marginal 
events. For illustration, a rise in the degree of spending decentralization from 20% to 50%, 
which is realistic given the variation in our regression sample from 1.5% to 55.6%, would 
decrease the number of severe terror events by roughly 2.7, from 3.9 down to 1.2. Compared 
to the effect for all transnational events, the decrease in absolute terms is more than quadruple 
in size (-0.63 versus -2.7).  
Table 3 tests for the robustness of our results to the inclusion of additional variables 
that have been proposed as determinants of terror in the previous literature or are intuitively 
appealing as such. As in Piazza (2006) and Dreher and Gassebner (2007), we test for the 
sensitivity of the estimates to the inclusion of population growth and GDP growth. According 
to  Piazza  (2006),  the  first  puts  pressure  on  a  countries’  economic  and  political  system, 
increasing terrorism, while, following the literature on conflicts, negative exogenous shocks 
in the latter, may increase the likelihood of civil conflict. However, GDP growth may equally 
well be correlated with reductions in poverty, potentially mitigating social cleavages. 
In addition to government fractionalization that is included in the main regression, we 
also test four alternative measures of ‘social cleavage’ and heterogeneous preferences in the 
population: ethnic fractionalization, language fractionalization, religion fractionalization, and 
fractionalization of the parliamentary opposition. Furthermore, recently founded states might 
have still weak and ineffective institutions, thus not (yet) being able to channel preferences of 
some social groups into the political decision-making process, serving as political stabilizers. 
Finally, we include a dichotomous variable that takes the value ‘one’ if the country is in a 
state of internal or external war. Again, analogously to the previous argument, we can expect 
some government institutions to not work well and some basic human rights to be severely 
constrained during times of war giving rise to social grievance.  
As  can  be  seen  from  Table  3,  most  of  the  additional  variables  are  completely 
insignificant. The exceptions are the war dummy and the dummy for new states that are 
significant at the five percent level, with a positive and, respectively, a negative coefficient. 
Most  importantly,  however,  the  negative  impact  of  expenditure  decentralization  on  terror 
stays significant at the five percent level at least according to all specifications. Moreover, its   17 
coefficient is of similar size across all estimated models, which shows that decentralization is 
not strongly correlated with any of the additional determinants included to the model.  
We conclude that our results are robust to the choice of method and control variables, 




6. Summary and Conclusion 
This  paper  empirically  analyzed  the  impact  of  decentralization  on  the  occurrence  of 
transnational terror using panel data for a maximum of 109 countries over the years 1976-
2000. Taking account of the potential simultaneity between terror and decentralization we 
find that expenditure decentralization robustly reduces the number of terror events in a target 
country, while political decentralization has no impact. In the words of Keman (2000), we 
find the ‘power to act (= spend)’ to matter more than the ‘power to decide’ for the fight 
against transnational terrorism.  
Building closely on Frey and Luechinger (2004) – but distinguishing decentralization 
of policy implementation from decentralization of political decision-making – we argue that 
effective local government administrations (potentially taking over responsibilities from other 
dysfunctioning  local  or  supra-local  administrations)  are  more  important  in  stabilizing  a 
country than the dispersion of actual decision-making authority at the local level. In addition, 
local spending autonomy may increase competition among jurisdictions, thereby improving 
the quality of the public good ‘security’.  
Our  results  bear  important  policy  implications.  Since  the  seminal  work  of  Becker 
(1968),  economists  view  undertaking  criminal  acts  as  the  outcome  of  rational  decision-
making. Applying this rational choice model of criminal behavior to terrorists’ decisions, 
additional terror will occur when the expected marginal benefit of an additional terrorist act 
outweighs its marginal costs. Indeed, it has been shown that the propensity to commit terrorist 
acts can be influenced by changes in external costs and benefits (Enders and Sandler 1995). 
Traditional strategies for combating terror aim at raising the direct or opportunity costs of 
committing such acts, while more recent approaches focus on reducing the (expected) benefits 
of terrorist activity, particularly in light of failing deterrence strategies (Lichbach 1987, Frey 
1988, Sandler and Enders 2004, Wilkinson 2002). In this paper, we have shown that greater 
spending decentralization might be one instrument to influence terrorists’ marginal costs and 
                                                
31  We  also  replicated  the  analysis  for  a  sample  of  countries  without  political  autonomy.  The  results  are 
unchanged.   18 
benefits of their acts, reducing the occurrence of transnational terror. Previous research has 
argued that decentralized spending competences lead to inefficient overspending and create 
problems of coordination, thereby preventing effective security and finally making a country 
more attractive for terrorist activity. As we have shown in this paper, on average, the opposite 
is true. According to these results some policy makers’ calls for greater centralization in the 
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Table 1: Decentralization and Terror, 1976-2000  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Fiscal decentralization (t-1) -0.015* -0.022*** -0.035** -0.162** -0.310** -0.029**
[1.82] [2.65] [2.32] [2.27] [2.38] [2.34]
Political autonomy 0.321 0.139 0.141 0.671 1.228 0.287
[1.43] [0.49] [0.27] [0.55] [0.62] [1.20]
(log) GDP per capita (t-1) 0.219** 0.104 0.174 0.297 0.257 1.055 0.099
[2.13] [1.44] [1.59] [1.54] [0.79] [1.40] [0.98]
(log) Population (t-1) 0.462*** 0.160** 0.407*** 0.837*** 1.255*** 3.268*** 0.417***
[4.98] [2.48] [3.85] [5.22] [2.66] [3.08] [4.15]
Political freedom (t-1) 0.104* 0.034 0.151** 0.170 0.405 1.020* 0.159**
[1.71] [0.81] [2.25] [1.48] [1.39] [1.93] [2.11]
Political freedom, change -0.002 -0.102 0.013 0.175 -0.594 -0.384 0.117
[0.01] [1.31] [0.10] [0.73] [0.88] [0.30] [0.82]
Government fractionalization (t-1) 0.538** 0.548*** 0.418 0.765 0.377 1.593 0.302
[2.27] [3.20] [1.62] [1.64] [0.25] [0.57] [0.93]
Voting with U.S. (t-1) 1.458** 0.557 1.524** 1.709 13.795 20.002 1.557
[2.05] [1.03] [2.04] [1.23] [1.59] [1.57] [1.53]
Constant -10.735*** -3.223** -9.220*** -17.609*** -59.769*** -6.847***
[5.34] [2.31] [3.99] [5.11] [2.83] [3.34]
Observations 934 1911 826 826 685 685 685
Number of countries 76 109 63 63 60 60 60
Method NBR NBR NBR Logit 2SLS IV Tobit IV Probit
Wald test (Prob>chi2) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes:
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The dependent variable is the number of transnational terror events in a particular year and country (columns 1-3, 5-7) or a 
dummy with value ‘1’ if a terrorist event occurs (column 4).
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 Table 2: Decentralization and Terror according to severity, 1976-2000 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
severe less severe severe less severe severe less severe
Fiscal decentralization (t-1) -0.040*** 0.007 -0.040** -0.003 -0.033* -0.001
[4.12] [0.71] [2.18] [0.27] [1.94] [0.12]
Political autonomy -0.378 0.214 -0.786 0.527 0.093 0.21
[1.29] [0.71] [1.19] [1.50] [0.45] [1.26]
(log) GDP per capita (t-1) 0.132 0.187 0.288 0.254 0.032 0.141
[1.01] [1.32] [1.19] [1.54] [0.26] [1.59]
(log) Population (t-1) 0.625*** 0.099 1.043*** 0.214* 0.407*** 0.100
[5.24] [0.91] [4.75] [1.79] [3.84] [1.23]
Political freedom (t-1) 0.216*** -0.051 0.359*** -0.050 0.163* 0.016
[2.61] [0.49] [2.72] [0.43] [1.87] [0.23]
Political freedom, change 0.065 0.037 0.240 0.053 0.094 0.061
[0.34] [0.18] [0.90] [0.21] [0.81] [0.45]
Government fractionalization (t-1) 0.601* -0.162 1.134** -0.110 0.365 -0.058
[1.77] [0.41] [2.15] [0.23] [1.22] [0.24]
Voting with U.S. (t-1) 2.399** -0.714 0.060 0.038 1.99 -0.693
[2.50] [0.62] [0.04] [0.03] [1.59] [0.71]
Constant -12.962*** -5.720** -20.299*** -8.906*** -6.820*** -3.248**
[4.84] [2.26] [4.38] [3.14] [3.07] [1.97]
Observations 826 826 826 826 685 685
Number of countries 63 63 63 63 60 60
Method NBR NBR Logit Logit IV Probit IV Probit
Wald test (Prob>chi2) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes:
All regressions include a dummy for each year.
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The dependent variable is the number of transnational terror events in a particular year and country (columns 1, 
2, 5, 6) or a dummy with value ‘1’ if a terrorist event occurs (columns 3, 4). A terror event is defined as severe 
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Table 3: Decentralization and Terror, NBR, 1976-2000 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Fiscal decentralization (t-1) -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.023*** -0.019** -0.021** -0.025*** -0.023*** -0.025***
[2.64] [2.62] [2.77] [2.25] [2.48] [2.95] [2.65] [2.75]
Political autonomy 0.139 0.139 0.172 0.266 0.095 0.226 0.131 0.259
[0.49] [0.49] [0.58] [0.96] [0.32] [0.79] [0.46] [0.83]
(log) GDP per capita (t-1) 0.185* 0.174 0.056 0.165 0.196 0.099 0.177 0.064
[1.68] [1.58] [0.47] [1.57] [1.63] [0.83] [1.59] [0.53]
(log) Population (t-1) 0.411*** 0.407*** 0.331*** 0.356*** 0.413*** 0.441*** 0.409*** 0.363***
[3.90] [3.85] [3.02] [3.41] [3.87] [4.15] [3.85] [2.94]
Political freedom (t-1) 0.150** 0.151** 0.159** 0.191*** 0.159** 0.130* 0.153** 0.155*
[2.23] [2.24] [2.35] [2.80] [2.29] [1.89] [2.25] [1.89]
Political freedom, change 0.019 0.013 -0.025 0.010 0.019 0.012 0.014 -0.034
[0.14] [0.10] [0.19] [0.07] [0.14] [0.09] [0.10] [0.24]
Government fractionalization (t-1) 0.413 0.417 0.377 0.373 0.406 0.448* 0.420 0.530*
[1.60] [1.62] [1.45] [1.48] [1.57] [1.74] [1.63] [1.88]
Voting with U.S. (t-1) 1.519** 1.524** 1.674** 0.996 1.510** 1.933** 1.491* 1.583*
[2.03] [2.04] [2.18] [1.33] [2.02] [2.45] [1.93] [1.93]
GDP growth (t-1) 0.005
[0.40]
Population growth (t-1) 0.000
[0.01]












Constant -9.390*** -7.544*** -5.019** -8.350*** -9.582*** -9.010*** -9.279*** -5.645**
[4.06] [3.31] [2.04] [3.70] [3.91] [3.90] [3.96] [2.22]
Observations 823 826 767 767 826 826 826 717
Number of countries 63 63 60 60 63 63 63 54
Wald test (Prob>chi2) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes:
All regressions include a dummy for each year.
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The dependent variable is the number of transnational terror events in a particular year and country.
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Appendix A: Descriptions and sources 
Variable Definition Source
Number of terror events Number of transnational terror events for each country and year, 
defined as “violence, or the threat of violence, calculated to create an 
atmosphere of fear and alarm.”
MIPT Terrorism 
Knowledge Base
Fiscal decentralization Total expenditure of sub-national government tiers divided by total 
spending by all levels of government.
IMF’s Government 
Finance Statistics
Political autonomy Dichotomous indicator of autonomy of second tier governments that 
takes on the value of one if “subnational legislatures have autonomy 
in certain specified areas – i.e. constitutional authority to legislate – 
not explicitly subject to central laws.”
Treisman (2002)
(log) GDP per capita Gross domestic product divided by midyear population. Data are in 
constant U.S. dollars.
World Bank (2006)
(log) Population Total population is based on the de facto definition of population, 
which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship, 
except for refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum.
World Bank (2006)
Political freedom Average value of political rights and civil liberties, ranging from -7 to 
-1, where higher values reflect greater freedom. 
Freedom House (2005)
Political freedom, change Yearly change in index ranging from 1 to 7, where higher values 
reflect greater freedom. 
Freedom House (2005)
Government fractionalization Probability that two deputies picked at random from among the 
government parties will be of different parties( low(0)-high(1)).
Beck et al. (2001)
Voting with U.S. Votes in agreement with the US are coded as 1, votes in disagreement 
as 0, and abstentions or absences as 0.5. The resulting numbers are 
then divided by the total number of votes in each country and year. 
Dreher and Sturm (2006)
GDP growth Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on 
constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2000 U.S. 
dollars. 
World Bank (2006)
Population growth Annual population growth rate, based on the de facto definition of 
population.
World Bank (2006)
New state, dummy The timing of national independence (0 if before 1914; 1 if between 
1914 and 1945; 2 if between 1946 and 1989; and 3 if after 1989).
Gallup et al. (2001)
War, dummy Dummy for countries that had external war over the period 1960-85. Gallup et al. (2001)
Ethnic fractionalization Fractionalizationj=, 
with sij being the share of group i in country j.
Alesina et al. (2003)
Language fractionalization Fractionalizationj=, 
with sij being the share of group i in country j.
Alesina et al. (2003)
Religious fractionalization Fractionalizationj=, 
with sij being the share of group i in country j.
Alesina et al. (2003)
Opposition fractionalization Probability that two deputies picked at random from among the 
opposition parties will be of different parties( low(0)-high(1)).
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Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Number of terror events 1.70 4.59 0.00 50.00
Fiscal decentralization 20.84 13.48 1.45 55.62
Political autonomy 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00
(log) GDP per capita 7.51 1.53 4.31 10.64
(log) Population 15.95 1.61 12.29 20.95
Political freedom -3.66 1.97 -7.00 -1.00
Political freedom, change 0.03 0.46 -4.00 3.50
Government fractionalization 0.20 0.29 0.00 1.00
Voting with U.S. 0.30 0.15 0.06 0.84
GDP growth 3.08 5.79 -51.03 38.20
Population growth 1.73 1.44 -16.55 18.71
New state, dummy 1.25 1.03 0.00 3.00
War, dummy 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00
Ethnic fractionalization 0.43 0.26 0.00 0.93
Language fractionalization 0.39 0.29 0.00 0.92
Religious fractionalization 0.41 0.25 0.00 0.86
Opposition fractionalization 0.49 0.29 0.00 1.00  
Note: Statistics are based on the estimation sample of Table 1, column 2. 
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Appendix C: Average number of terror events per year   

























2000 0.76 0.70  
 
Note: Numbers are based on the estimation sample of Table 1, column 2. 
 
 